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ransitional justice is a rich area of
inquiry. The literature and the academic
discourse surrounding the phenomenon
of transitional justice are at the forefront
of human rights scholarship. Much of
this discourse focuses on questions of
the functional choices: restorative or retributive jus-
tice. A “restorative” approach to justice focuses on
the idea of reconciliation while the “retributive”
approach focuses on the punishment of perpetra-
tors. The idea of truth telling, which encompasses
truth commissions and historical memory, is most
closely connected to a restorative approach to jus-
tice, although seeking the truth is also an implicit
and explicit goal of criminal courts which serve a
primarily retributive function.
Nevertheless, the standards of evidence and the
uses that are made from established truths are not
the same in restorative projects as they are in crimi-
nal courts. Truth fits into these distinct processes in
markedly different ways. The truth telling project
has been a flexible and dynamic process that can
be highly controversial and perplexing. Much of the
confusion is rooted in the very idea of truth. Even
where commissions avoid the language of truth
telling — by instead focusing on “disclosure” or “his-
torical clarification” — the idea of Truth looms large.
The Need for Truth
The political and social construction of truth as
it occurs in the formal processes, which often follow
atrocities, state-sponsored terrorism or authoritarian
regimes, is intimately connected to memory. It is
dependent upon individual and social memories for
data, sometimes long after events have transpired.
And the task of truth commissions is at times
explicitly referred to as the construction of an offi-
cial historical memory, necessitated by the official
denial — and the resultant distortion of reality and
history — that often accompanies state-sponsored 
terror.
The systematic implementation of terror by the
state affects both individual and societal conceptu-
alizations of reality. Primo Levi, in The Drowned and
the Saved, discusses how Auschwitz isolated and
alienated the prisoner: “One entered hoping at least
for the solidarity of one’s companions in misfortune,
but the hoped for allies, except in special cases,
were not there. There were instead a thousand
sealed off monads, and between them a desperate
covert and continuous struggle.”1 Because the con-
text of a terrorist state inhibits the ability of the
individual to verify his experience of reality by com-
paring it to the way others perceive things, she or
he becomes unsure of what she or he is actually
experiencing. Meaning itself becomes problematic
because it is, of course, contingent upon shared
perceptions. 
Jaime Malamud in Game Without End: State
Terror and the Politics of Justice beautifully dissects
the nature of “disarticulating power,” which elimi-
nates the possibility for any kind of collective action
or even discourse. Malamud argues that state terror
atomizes society in a way that manipulates the indi-
vidual’s concept of reality. Individuals convince
themselves that they are outside the realm of politi-
cal danger by rationalizing the activities of the
state.2 This phenomenon is, in fact, widely observed
by psycho-social theorists and researchers. When an
individual observes a person being abducted, or
notice that a person has disappeared, he commonly
rationalizes “she must have done something,” even
if there is evidence to the contrary. When individu-
als were in situations that clearly placed them at
risk, they would choose to believe absurd scenarios
that minimized the risk: “the person on the phone
who made the death threat probably dialed the
wrong number”, for example. In places such as
Argentina and Guatemala, it was and is quite com-
mon for the military and other agents of the state to
consciously manipulate citizens’ perceptions of reali-
ty — and later historical memory — through fear and
confusion. The classic case is that of the torturer
telling the victim that no one will believe her story if
she tries to talk about it.
Levi also addresses the question of the inten-
tionality of this distortion or denial of reality in
Auschwitz — the conscious effort of the Nazis to
force their victims to internalize the irrational,
incomprehensible horror of the death camp. “At any
rate, the entire history of the brief millennial Reich
can be reread as a war against memory, an
Orwellian falsification of memory, falsification of
reality, negation of reality.”3 There is something uni-
versal about this observation. It is in the nature of
terrorist power to alter reality and to attempt to
manipulate memory. Reestablishing reality (truth),
and legitimizing memory, then, are essential to any
post-atrocity reconciliation. Reconciliation is on
some basic level about reconnecting individuals to a
rational social reality. It can be as much about rec-
onciling individuals to their own experiences and
memories as it is about reestablishing relationships
between individuals or between social and political
factions.
Objections to Truth Telling
Despite the demonstrable need for truth telling,
especially in cases of official denial, the work of
truth commissions rarely satisfies a society’s hunger
for retributive or even restorative justice. Although
trials also seek to uncover truths, truth is really only
one of the necessary conditions for establishing
innocence or guilt in specific cases. Truth in the trial
setting is therefore limited by its relevance to the
guilt or innocence of the criminal defendant.
Moreover, standards of evidence are well defined.
Much of the truth about what has occurred during a
crime is irrelevant or inadmissible in a courtroom.
Restorative justice focuses primarily on the reconcil-
iation between victim and perpetrator. This generally
involves giving both parties access to more contex-
tual information about the other. This sharing of
information is also a kind of truth telling, but truth
in this process is also limited by relevance. If truth
doesn’t really contribute to the restoration of the
broken relationships, then presumably it won’t be
revealed.
Evidence gathered by truth commissions can in
some cases be used for criminal prosecutions. More
commonly, the findings of truth commissions can be
used to heal social relationships in societies that
have been torn apart. Or, as the experience of South
Africa demonstrates, the process of truth gathering
itself can be turned into a kind therapeutic social
dialogue. Despite the fact that truth has enormous
utility for the seekers of justice, truth in and of itself
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does not constitute justice. Because truth commis-
sions operate within the larger context of transition-
al justice, they are often held accountable for a lack
of justice. This can be simply a problem of inappro-
priate expectations. The goals of truth commissions
vary, but the overall goal of establishing truth is
always primary. Truth commissions seek to establish
the truth for its own sake. It is assumed to be a
reasonable, important and necessary project.
Occasionally truth and justice are seen as
opposing goals. The construction of this mispercep-
tion of the dichotomous “choice” between truth and
justice finds its model in the amnesty for disclosure
policy of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC). Richard Goldstone and others
have pointed out that the perceived trade-off in the
South Africa case is more myth than reality. In per-
haps the most contested case, the murder of
Stephen Biko, Goldstone has argued that it would
never have been possible to prosecute Biko’s killers
since, without confessions, there was not enough
evidence for any kind of criminal prosecution. So
despite the fact that amnesties leave the victimized
largely dissatisfied, the real choice, in Biko’s case as
well as others, was not between truth and retribu-
tion — the real choice was between truth and noth-
ing. Moreover, South Africa is an extremely
important but also atypical model. It is the only
case in which amnesty was explicitly tied to full dis-
closure. Most scholars and analysts now agree that
there is no real trade off between truth and justice,
and nothing inherently oppositional about these
goals. Prioritizing truth should not make justice less
attainable. 
Why is the idea of truth problematic? 
My analysis assumes that truth is possible,
generally desirable, and indeed that there is a right
to truth. I am concerned with how the idea of truth
in this context is understood, since the hotly con-
tested notion of truth stands at the center of human
rights discourse. The relationship between this con-
structed idea of truth and a more absolute notion of
truth is problematic. And the resolution of this prob-
lem is a very high stakes affair. 
Truth and memory are by their very nature
thorny concepts. Even an avowed opponent of post-
modern skepticism could rightly be skeptical of the
idea of “official” truth and/or official memory.
Certainly, while we can all acknowledge that
Holocaust deniers are promoting lies and falsehoods,
we must also acknowledge that individual experi-
ences are limited and contextualized. The construc-
tion of a shared memory from individual accounts is
quite complex. The assumption that this kind of
clearly constructed truth is synonymous with a more
absolute notion of Truth seems clearly problematic
and misguided. The relationship between absolute
Truth and the work of truth commissions becomes
even more problematic when we consider what is
known about the nature of individual memory and
trauma.
The controversies surrounding Rigoberta
Menchú, the Benjamin Wilkomirski story, and sever-
al other less political examples of fabricated memo-
ry that served a social and/or psychological purpose
raise important questions. Rigoberta Menchú, the
Guatemalan indigenous rights activist, is accused of
manipulating the details of her personal story so
that it would more effectively serve a broader politi-
cal agenda. Wilkomirski is accused of completely
fabricating a personal history in which he claims,
falsely, that he was a child survivor of Auschwitz.
His fabrication seems to be a symptom of his own
mental frailty which results from actual traumatic
childhood experiences that took place far from Nazi
death camps. While neither Menchú nor Wilkomirski
testified before truth commissions, their stories for a
time became part of the standard canon in the his-
torical records of genocide in Guatemala and Nazi
Germany. Menchú’s testimony is still considered by
many to be an important document which con-
tributes to a “truthful” understanding of what tran-
spired in Guatemala. And some even argue that
Wilkomirski seems to have articulated the reality of
Auschwitz in way that contributes to our under-
standing of the Holocaust. These cases raise some
serious questions about the relationships between
memory, testimony and absolute truth. 
Even in cases which are less controversial, indi-
vidual experience is essentially positioned and limit-
ed. Conflicts between individual perceptions and
experiences are inevitable.
Different models for truth telling
There are many different models of truth gath-
ering that reflect a wide range of potential objec-
tives. Truth commissions are often limited to the
fairly straightforward task of gathering testimony —
from a specifically defined subset of potential wit-
nesses and survivors about very specifically defined
kinds of abuses — and recording and reporting these
carefully chosen accounts. And in other cases, the
scope of the investigation is broadened to include
different kinds of evidence about a broader range of
abuses committed by various political actors and
factions. The truth gathering process can be con-
nected to criminal trials, or prohibited from con-
tributing evidence to criminal prosecutions. 
In some cases, truth commissions are called
upon to do more than just gather and report testi-
mony and evidence. More complex objectives, such
as memorialization and reconciliation, can be part of
the explicit mandate of a truth commission. In the
Guatemalan case, the UN-sponsored truth commis-
sion called itself the commission for “historical clari-
fication,” and the Archbishop’s committee took the
task one step further in its parallel commission ded-
icated to the “recuperation of historical memory.”
Disclosure alone is complicated and contentious, but
these more complex objectives add to the difficulty
of truth telling. 
The conscious construction of official memory
has an even more tenuous relationship with absolute
Truth than a more straightforward recording of “just
the facts.” South Africa’s TRC is probably the most
ambitious truth-telling process of them all, both in
terms of the breadth of its objectives (social healing
and reconciliation) and its methodology of public
forums in which victims and perpetrators confronted
one another. These more ambitious projects raise
even more complex sets of questions. Perhaps these
projects also have the unintended consequence of
raising expectations to a level that inevitably leads
to disappointment and cynicism. 
The Importance of Truth
Because truth telling has historically been the
victim of these unrealistic expectations, and
because the idea of Truth seems so elusive, some
might lament the choice of the word “truth” to
generically describe the work of commissions which
seek to encourage disclosure as an antidote to the
denial of state-sponsored terrorism or atrocity. But I
think that the choice to use the notion of “truth” to
describe this kind of project was both fortuitous and
appropriate. In an age of skepticism, it is refreshing
to reassert the importance of Truth, even while
acknowledging the problem of positionality. And by
explicitly connecting this process of public disclo-
sure with the loftier idea of Truth, the responsibility
of truth commissions to commit themselves fully
and to the best of their abilities to accuracy and
fairness is reinforced. This both legitimizes the
process and makes it more meaningful.
Nevertheless, establishing a more universal
understanding of the meaning of truth in these
social and political projects is important. Would it be
possible to establish standards of evidence that
would still allow sufficient space for victims and
others to tell their stories safely and fully? What are
the risks associated with lending credence or skep-
ticism to differing accounts? Although considering
the nature of truth has always occupied philoso-
phers . . . understanding truth is a genuinely eternal
pursuit. Today, these ancient epistemological ques-
tions are rife with immediate, high-stakes, real-
world policy implications.
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